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Abstract
Much of the commentary in the wake of last month’s presidential election has focused on
the magnitude and historic aspects of Barack Obama’s victory and the deteriorating economic
environment in which it played out. Little thought has been given to the influence of foreign
affairs in the election. Yet even in this year’s contest, which appears to lend considerable support
to economic-based theories of elections, international events clearly played an important role by
shaping the nomination process for both major parties and in Obama’s selection of Joseph Biden
as his running mate.
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Much of the commentary in the wake of last month’s presidential election 
has focused on the historic aspects of the victory by Democrat Barack Obama 
over Republican John McCain, the magnitude of this victory, and the 
deteriorating economic environment in which the election played out. Little 
thought has been given to the role of foreign affairs. This oversight is not 
unexpected because, by and large, the literature on American politics assigns to 
foreign affairs a minimal role in influencing election outcomes. Instead, long-term 
factors such as party identification or social characteristics are frequently cited as 
vote determinants. The only issue that is consistently said to be relevant in the 
voting booth is the domestic economy. 
Given this body of scholarly knowledge, it is quite a surprise that 
politicians seeking federal office, especially presidential candidates, spend so 
much time talking about foreign affairs. An approach more firmly rooted in the 
academic literature might involve dispensing with non-economic issues 
altogether—especially international issues. The political scientist-cum-campaign 
advisor might suggest doing only three things: manipulating data to paint an 
appropriately dire or robust picture of the nation’s economic health, rallying the 
candidate’s fellow partisans, and mobilizing voters possessing certain 
demographic attributes. Alas, few political scientists manage campaigns, so we 
cannot directly test their theories. While politicians certainly do engage in the 
activities scholars might recommend, they also spend an inordinate amount of 
time discussing all kinds of issues, including foreign affairs, as if these things 
mattered. Perhaps there is an explanation for this behavior. 
I argue here that the elections literature is incomplete because it does not 
take foreign affairs seriously. Much of this oversight is due to the purpose of this 
flagship political science subfield. While the elections literature comprises some 
of the best political science research, its effort to identify the consistent and on-
going patterns that can routinely be expected to explain electoral outcomes has 
obscured the important role that international events frequently play. I 
demonstrate the importance of foreign policy by tracing its role in the 2008 
election. Even in this campaign, which on its surface appears to lend considerable 
support to the economic-based theories of elections, international events clearly 
played an important role. 
 
Traditional Assessments of Campaigns and Elections in America 
 
While there is significant disagreement over what factors shape voter choice, the 
overwhelming academic consensus is that foreign affairs have little or no 
influence on elections. The public is thought to possess scant information, hold 
few opinions, and be generally indifferent to international issues. One major 
strand of election studies maintains that timely issues of any sort are relatively 
unimportant. The “Michigan School” holds that voters have long-standing 
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judgments about the parties based on issues, events, and candidates from previous 
elections and that these long term factors—as opposed to issues specific to a 
campaign—determine voters’ partisan identification and decisions in the voting 
booth.1 The rival “Columbia School” contends that social characteristics, 
including race, class, religion, and gender, are the most reliable determinants of 
the vote.2 Incumbency is also often cited as an important factor in voter choice, 
particularly in congressional elections.3 
A second major strand within the elections literature argues that voter 
assessments regarding the state of the economy determine election outcomes.4 
While the economy as an issue dominates this branch of the literature, other 
domestic issues like abortion or gays in the military occasionally receive some 
attention.5 Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg summarize this body of 
work as follows: “many economic voting models include little else in the way of 
candidate or noneconomic issue factors, as if they were of little importance. When 
other variables…are included, it is sometimes pointed out that those ‘control’ 
variables are themselves influenced by economic factors.”6 This elections 
literature has only occasionally acknowledged foreign affairs, usually with 
                                                 
1 See, for example: Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, 
The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). Larry M. Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting 
Behavior, 1952-1996,” American Journal of Political Science (2000) 44: 35-50. Donald Green, 
Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the 
Social Identities of Voters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
2 See, for instance: Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A 
Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1954). Barbara Norrander, “The Evolution of the Gender Gap,” Public Opinion Quarterly (1990) 
54: 566-576. Geoffrey C. Layman, “Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The 
Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment from 1980 to 1994,” Public Opinion Quarterly 
(1997) 61: 288-316. Herbert F. Weisberg, “The Demographics of a New Voting Gap: Marital 
Differences in American Voting,” Public Opinion Quarterly (1987) 51: 335-343. 
3 Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 4th ed. (Boston: Longman, 1997). 
David R. Mayhew, “Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Presidential Elections: The Historical 
Record,” Political Science Quarterly 123:2 (2008), 201-28. 
4 For example: Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Richard Nadeau and Michael Lewis-Beck, “National 
Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections,” Journal of Politics (2001) 63: 159-181.  
5 For instance: Alan I. Abramowitz, “It’s Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential 
Election,” Journal of Politics (1995) 57: 176-186. Alvarez and Nagler, “Economics, Entitlements, 
and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election,” American Journal of Political 
Science (1998) 42: 1349-1363. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).  
6 Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, “What Determines the Vote,” Controversies in 
Voting Behavior, Niemi and Weisberg, eds. (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), 185. 
2 The Forum Vol. 6 [2008], No. 4, Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol6/iss4/art5
reference to the Korean or Vietnam wars.7 But even in these rare instances, 
foreign affairs play a minor and idiosyncratic role and do not challenge the 
general consensus that the international realm is unimportant in the voting booth.8 
Yet foreign affairs have frequently had significant ramifications on 
Election Day. International issues were consistently important from 1940 until the 
end of the Cold War. Their influence could be seen not only in campaign 
discourse and issue polling, but also in the emphasis voters placed on character 
traits like leadership and firmness, which served as proxies for assessments of 
how candidates would handle hostile foreign leaders.9 
In addition, the electoral importance of foreign affairs has been especially 
evident during and immediately after America’s major wars. Throughout U.S. 
history, wars have always been contentious and part of partisan rancor. The 
Spanish-American War was a major force in the 1898 and 1900 elections. In 
1898, the GOP rode a wave of patriotism and, bolstered by the victory tour of 
President William McKinley, made a strong showing in that year’s midterm 
election in what otherwise would almost certainly have been a rough political 
climate. Two years later, the war-spurred issue of imperialism played a central 
role in the campaign. Similarly, World War I was the primary issue in the 1918 
and 1920 elections. In the first of those contests, the ruling Democrats lost both 
houses of Congress. The Midwest, home to most of the German-Americans who 
were heavily repressed during the war, experienced a dramatic swing towards the 
                                                 
7 Steven J. Rosenstone, Forecasting Presidential Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983). C.W. Ostrom, Jr. and D.M. Simon, “Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of 
Presidential Popularity,” American Political Science Review (1985) 79: 334-358. Stephen Hess 
and Michael Nelson, “Foreign Policy: Dominance and Decisiveness in Presidential Elections,” 
The Elections of 1984, Nelson, ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985). Miller and 
Shanks, “Policy Directions and Presidential Leadership: Alternative Interpretations of the 1980 
Presidential Elections,” British Journal of Political Science 12 (1982): 266-356. Norman H. Nie, 
Sydney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1976). Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on 
Policy,” American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 175-90. Gerald M. Pomper, “From 
Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956-1968,” American Political Science 
Review 66 (1972): 415-28. Campbell, et.al, 49-50, 75, 135, and 546. 
8 A small group of dissenters have challenged these views. The best overall counterargument is: 
John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do 
Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz Before a Blind Audience?,’” American Political Science Review 
83:1 (1989): 123-141. For similar findings about the 2000 presidential election, see: Sowmya 
Anand and Jon A. Krosnick, “The Impact of Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Goals on Public 
Preferences among Presidential Candidates: A Study of Issue Publics and the Attentive Public in 
the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33:1 (2003): 31-71. For 1980 
and 1984: Miroslav Nincic and Barbara Hinckley, “Foreign Policy and the Evaluation of 
Presidential Candidates,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:2 (1991): 333-355. 
9 James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, Red Over Blue: The 2004 Elections and American 
Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 14. 
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GOP. In the 1920 election, the war and its lingering effects gave the Republicans 
unified control of government in one of the biggest landslides in history.10 
Likewise, World War II factored heavily in the 1940 and 1944 elections by, 
among other things, encouraging Franklin Roosevelt to break the two-term 
tradition.11 
The Cold War conflicts in Korea and Vietnam also had a demonstrable 
electoral influence. In the 1952 election, pitting Dwight Eisenhower against Adlai 
Stevenson, the war was the campaign’s primary issue, and public opinion polling 
indicates that Ike benefited at those points in the campaign when other issues 
were obscured. In 1968, the Vietnam War played a major role in forcing President 
Lyndon Johnson to abandon his hopes for reelection and in weakening the 
eventual Democratic nominee, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who was seen 
as an opponent of what by then had become a substantial anti-war wing of the 
party. In a political season overshadowed by Vietnam, Republican Richard Nixon 
won a general election that saw Democrats take a massive plunge in their popular 
support (relative to the previous presidential election) that can only be compared 
to the GOP’s 1912 and 1932 debacles. Four years later, in the first nomination 
contest under the new primary system, Democrats, then under the control of the 
anti-war New Politics faction, selected the ideologically extreme George 
McGovern.12 
In sum, these cases suggest that foreign affairs can play a pivotal role in 
elections. Many political scientists are wary of exploring contingent events like 
wars, preferring instead to focus on underlying or long-term factors. This 
approach is, of course, perfectly appropriate to address many questions. Yet as 
David Mayhew argues, it can also lead to “blinkered explanation[s].…We pay a 
considerable price as would-be explainers of politics by ignoring…events as 
causes…[and] contingency. Many events are contingent, and in the real world 
unexpected happenings are powerful engines of political change.”13 This 
hesitancy to deal with contingent events, along with the focus on understanding 
election outcomes by way of consistent, long-term factors, explains the relative 
                                                 
10 Robert P. Saldin, War and American Political Development: Parties, State Building, and 
Democratic Rights Policy, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, 
2008. 
11 Mayhew, “Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Presidential Elections: The Historical Record,” 226-
8. 
12 Saldin. Many argue that Humphrey might have won in 1968 if he had forcefully broken with 
Johnson’s Vietnam policy. See, for instance: Lee Sigelman and Emmett Buell, Attack Politics: 
Negativity in Presidential Campaigns Since 1960 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1968), 
97-101. 
13 Mayhew, “Events as Causes: The Case of American Politics,” Political Contingency: Studying 
the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the Unforeseen, Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi, eds. (New York: 
New York University Press, 2007), 100, 120.  
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lack of attention that these major wars, and foreign affairs in general, have 
received in the political science elections literature. The 2001 terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington—a contingent event, if ever there was one—and the 
resulting military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with changes in 
national security policy at home, are deserving of more attention than current 
election models and forecasts afford. 
 
Campaigns and Elections in Post-9/11 America 
 
To understand fully the 2008 election, some context is helpful. Four national 
elections—two midterms and two presidential—have been held since the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001. While it may be an overstatement to claim, as 
some have, that 9/11 “changed everything,” it is undeniable that the events of that 
day profoundly influenced each federal election held since.14 Following the Cold 
War, foreign policy and national security concerns decreased in importance. 
While foreign affairs received routine attention in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 
elections, it was generally an afterthought for the American public. Not 
surprisingly, Democrats fared better in an electoral arena in which national 
security, a traditional Republican strong suit, was minimized and economic and 
welfare issues, Democratic strengths, were elevated. These domestically oriented 
elections saw Bill Clinton win two relatively easy victories and Al Gore carry the 
popular vote even while being denied the White House. The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, brought foreign affairs 
and national security back to the forefront of American electoral politics. 
If House Speaker “Tip” O’Neill was correct that “all politics is local,” the 
American public forgot that lesson in 2002, 2004, and 2006, when all politics was 
international. The only two post-9/11 midterms were effectively nationalized and 
focused on foreign policy. In the first instance, Republicans successfully used 
national security concerns, a popular president, and anticipation of a war with 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to pick up eight House seats and two Senate seats. These 
gains marked only the second time since 1894 that the party controlling the White 
House gained seats in both congressional chambers.15  
Similarly, the 2006 midterms were successfully nationalized, this time by 
the Democrats, and featured a relentless focus on what at the time appeared to be 
an inevitable failure in Iraq and what quite obviously was an unpopular president. 
                                                 
14 George W. Bush, “President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi Press Conference,” The White 
House, 23 Sept. 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-8.html. 
Richard Cheney, “Remarks by the Vice President,” The White House 23 Dec. 2003, 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031223-1.html. 
15 The other was 1932. In 1998 President Clinton’s Democrats gained five House seats but there 
was no change in the Senate’s partisan composition. 
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Shortly before the election, one poll found that when voters were asked which 
issues were “extremely important,” “the situation in Iraq” ranked first with 49%, 
followed by “terrorism” at 46%, the economy with 33%, illegal immigration at 
29%, and moral issues with 20%.16 More than anything else, Democratic gains of 
31 seats in the House and six seats in the Senate—sufficient to claim control of 
both chambers for the first time in 12 years—were owed to Democratic promises 
to end the war in Iraq.17 
The first presidential election after 9/11 was also dominated by foreign 
affairs and national security. Both candidates structured their campaigns around 
these issues. Lacking what was then considered to be President George W. Bush’s 
credibility on foreign affairs, Democrat John Kerry, in “reporting for duty,” spent 
much of his time emphasizing his strong leadership credentials, rooted in his 
Vietnam service.18 In arguing that Iraq was “the wrong war, in the wrong place, at 
the wrong time,” as well as a distraction from the more important War on Terror, 
Kerry hoped to establish himself as a tough, viable alternative to the sitting 
wartime president.19 The Republican campaign was similarly focused on 
defending what it saw as the inseparable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kerry’s 
“flip-flopping” positions on national security, and his lack of commitment to 
fighting terrorism.20 
Exit polls also demonstrated the importance of national security and 
foreign affairs. 34% of voters cited national security issues as most important, 
compared to 25% for economic issues, 20% for moral issues, and 12% for welfare 
issues. While some Democrats argued that moral issues were the most important 
factor, this claim failed to hold up under close inspection and had, in the analysis 
of James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, more to do with “the psychological 
wish many had to believe that the election was determined by millions upon 
millions of evangelical voters who had turned out in a fit of primitive 
prejudice.”21 
                                                 
16 “Issues,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/special/issues/. 
17 Ceaser and Daniel DiSalvo, “Midterm Elections, Partisan Context, and Political Leadership: 
The 2006 Elections and Party Alignment,” The Forum 4:3 (2006), 
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vo14/iss3/art11, 8. 
18 John Kerry, “Acceptance Speech at the Democratic National Convention,” Washington Post, 29 
July 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25678-2004Jul29.html. 
19 David M. Halbfinger and David F. Sanger, “Bush and Kerry Clash Over Iraq and a Timetable,” 
New York Times, 7 Sept. 2004,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/politics/campaign/07campaign.html. 
20 Ceaser and Busch, 7-8. 
21 Ceaser and Busch, 15. See also: Paul Freedman, “The Gay Marriage Myth: Terrorism, Not 
Values, Drove Bush’s Re-election,” Slate 5 Nov. 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2109275/. For an 
alternative view, see: Garry Wills, “The Day the Enlightenment Went Out,” New York Times, 4 
Nov. 2004, 
 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE2DA173CF937A35752C1A9629C8B63. 
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In sum, the first three post-9/11 elections were nationalized around foreign 
affairs and national security. It is clear that these issues had forcefully returned to 
American elections after more than a decade’s hiatus. In 2002 and 2004, this issue 
frame favored Republicans. Yet by 2006, the failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction and the appearance of a quagmire in Iraq provoked a sharp rebuke to 
Bush and the GOP. 
 
The 2008 Campaign and Election 
 
On election night in 2006, many anticipated a quick end to the Iraq War under the 
new Democratic Congress. It would have been a shock to hear a time traveler’s 
report that, despite a continuing conflict involving an even larger American troop 
commitment, the final weeks of the 2008 election would be waged on something 
other than the same foreign affairs turf that had dominated the other post-9/11 
campaigns. However, the 2008 general election will likely be remembered 
primarily (in addition to the demographic barriers that Obama’s victory shattered) 
for the economic context in which it was held. Two factors contributed to this 
situation.  
The most important of these was the stunning success of the troop “surge” 
that only President Bush could have anticipated. Effectively nullifying the 
Democrats’ election victory and their mandate for withdrawal, Bush adopted the 
opposite strategy by sending additional troops to Iraq. The new approach 
engineered by General David Petraeus proved effective, and violence subsided 
dramatically. This newfound stability, in turn, allowed for a political process to 
take root and for the development of the Iraqi Security Forces. It also took Iraq 
largely out the equation for the 2008 election. The second factor was the U.S. 
economy’s rapid decline. The full extent of the problem was not apparent until 
Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15, and a panic ensued. No previous 
American presidential election had been held amidst such conditions. 
Yet, even as the downturn in Iraqi violence allowed the American public 
to turn its attention to the downturn in the domestic economy, foreign affairs and 
national security still played a significant, though often overlooked, role in the 
campaign. Indeed, the nominations of Obama and McCain are difficult to imagine 
in an Iraq-free context. In addition, Obama’s selection of Joseph Biden as his vice 
presidential running mate was predicated largely on the Delaware Senator’s 
extensive background in foreign affairs and national security. Finally, despite all 
the economic upheaval and baggage from the unpopular Bush presidency, 
McCain, running largely on his foreign policy credentials, kept the election close 
and was actually ahead in September’s polls, until the nation’s economic situation 
became extremely dire. 
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Obama’s Nomination 
 
As many commentators noted during the fall campaign, Obama almost certainly 
would not have received the Democratic presidential nomination without his 
unique position on the Iraq War.22 Among the top-tier candidates, only Obama 
could claim consistent opposition to the conflict. Biden, Hillary Clinton, 
Christopher Dodd, and John Edwards had all cast Senate votes authorizing the use 
of force against Iraq in 2002, and Bill Richardson had vocally supported it. At the 
time, the American public was strongly supportive of Bush’s policy, too, but by 
2008 scarcely any Democratic primary voters approved of the war. This shift in 
public opinion put all the credible candidates except Obama in the awkward 
position of having to justify their initial support for an unpopular war. Quick to 
anticipate this problem and adept at changing positions to reflect current trends, 
Edwards toured the country to apologize for his vote, while less malleable 
candidates like Clinton and Biden focused instead on determining a practical 
policy to bring the war to a satisfactory and speedy conclusion.23  
Only Obama had the credibility of having opposed the war from the start. 
Among other things, this distinction helped him garner significant attention early 
in the process, raise money amongst his party’s liberal base, and argue that he 
alone had had the good judgment to oppose the war.24 This argument was 
especially critical to his candidacy because it was an effective way to undercut his 
primary weakness: a lack of experience. The Obama campaign contrasted his 
good judgment with the other candidates’ extensive experience in making bad 
decisions, a comparison that complimented the campaign’s themes of “Hope” and 
“Change.” The war issue was also critical in the Iowa Caucus, the most important 
contest for Obama. Despite signs of the surge’s success and a noticeably sagging 
economy, caucus goers in the Hawkeye State ranked Iraq and the economy as 
equally important in exit polls, far exceeding other issues.25 
Clearly, other factors were also at work in the Democratic nomination 
process. Obama’s ability to inspire voters is rare, and he put together an 
outstanding campaign staff and fund-raising operation. In addition, Clinton’s 
campaign failed to prepare for caucuses or a long nomination fight and was 
                                                 
22 See, for instance: Chuck Todd, Meet the Press 14 Sept. 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26702299/. 
23 John Edwards, “The Right Way in Iraq,” Washington Post 13 Nov. 2005, B7. Alexander Bolton, 
“Edwards Sees Apologies as Effective Strategy but Experts say Tactic Risky,” The Hill 6 Dec. 
2007, http://thehill.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=70138. Joseph Biden 
and Leslie H. Gelb, “Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq,” New York Times 1 May 2006,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/opinion/01biden.html.  
24 “Obama: Early Opposition to War Shows Better Judgment,” CNN 2 Oct. 2007,  
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/02/obama.iraq/index.html. 
25 “Exit Polls: Iowa – Democrats,” MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21225980/. 
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plagued by infighting.26 But it is unlikely that any of this would have made a 
difference in an Iraq-free context. Clinton herself has cited Iraq as the reason for 
her failure to win the Democratic nomination.27 In sum, the war provided Obama 
with what every non-front-runner needs: an opening that allowed his or her talents 
to be noticed. 
 
McCain’s Nomination 
 
With President Bush ineligible to run for reelection, Vice President Dick Cheney 
uninterested, and conservative golden boy George Allen defeated and disgraced in 
his Senate reelection campaign of 2006, the Republican party’s nomination was 
wide open with no clear favorite. Former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
held the lead in early polling, but his socially liberal views were anathema to 
much of the GOP’s base. Former governors Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney 
were popular in some quarters, but had their own liabilities. An evangelical, 
Huckabee was a favorite amongst social conservatives but his economic populism 
seemed to place him closer in proximity to Rust Belt Democrats than supply-side 
economists. Romney, meanwhile, appeared presidential but had a well-earned 
reputation for changing his positions for political expediency and was subject to 
anti-Mormon sentiment.  
McCain had plenty of name recognition but also faced intra-party 
misgivings. A self-styled “maverick” and media favorite, the Arizona Senator was 
not considered trustworthy by conservatives for, among other things, his role in 
campaign finance reform, his opposition to some of Bush’s tax cuts, and his 
advocacy for a significantly less stringent reform package on immigration than 
many conservatives preferred. Moreover, McCain’s campaign almost ended 
before it began. In July 2007, key staffers departed after dismal fund-raising and 
lavish spending had left the campaign nearly bankrupt. 
While many factors contributed to the eventual nominee’s success, 
McCain would not have won without the Iraq issue. Most importantly, McCain’s 
steadfast support of the troop surge during the war’s most demoralizing period, 
gave him immense credibility amongst an otherwise wary Republican base. Aside 
from the largely discredited Bush administration, McCain was—perhaps along 
with his Democratic ally Joseph Lieberman—the most prominent and vocal 
supporter of the surge. His repeated assertion that he would “rather lose an 
election than lose a war” cast McCain as a determined and principled champion of 
                                                 
26 Joshua Green, “The Front-Runner’s Fall,” The Atlantic (Sept. 2008),  
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200809/hillary-clinton-campaign. 
27 Robert Novak, “In Iraq and Under the Spotlight,” Washington Post 21 July 2008, A15.  
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what was an initially widely disparaged but ultimately successful strategy.28 Many 
observers and Republican commentators cited this single issue as the explanation 
for McCain’s primary triumph.29 In the words of conservative columnist and 
former Bush speech writer Michael Gerson, “McCain's come-from-behind 
nomination victory would have been inconceivable without this prophetic 
achievement…. [He] won the nomination of his party, in large part, as a 
vindicated prophet.”30 
 
Biden’s Selection 
 
The importance of foreign affairs was also evident in Obama’s selection of 
Delaware Senator and primary rival Joseph Biden as his vice-presidential 
nominee. Running mates generally fall into one of two categories, both of which 
are designed to increase the chances of electoral success. Occasionally, 
presidential nominees choose someone similar to themselves in an effort to 
highlight perceived strengths. Bill Clinton, for instance, employed this strategy 
when he picked Al Gore, another young Southern moderate. But most of the time, 
presidential nominees look to balance their ticket by selecting a running mate who 
shores up a perceived weakness. Thus the relatively inexperienced, Catholic 
Northerner, John Kennedy selected the long-serving, Protestant Southerner, 
Lyndon Johnson; similarly Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis chose 
Texan and Capitol Hill insider Lloyd Bentsen. 
From this balancing perspective, Lee Sigelman and Paul J. Wahlbeck 
found that the main considerations in selecting running mates include: region, 
demographics, religion, age, political experience, ideology, status as a former 
primary rival, and home-state size.31 The importance of each factor varies based 
on the characteristics of potential running mates and on the presidential nominee’s 
strengths and weaknesses. In any case, Biden filled many of these balancing 
criteria. As a white male, Biden was considered a safe choice because of a 
                                                 
28 Jonathan Martin, “Win the Battle, Lose the Election?,” Politico 10 April 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0407/3473.html. 
29 See, for instance: Fred Barnes, “A McCain Surge? Defending the Iraq War is his Best Shot,” 
The Weekly Standard 23 April 2007,  
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/521wqdng.asp.  
“McCain’s Surge: Why He’s Making a Primary Comeback,” Wall Street Journal (editorial) 18 
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widespread concern among liberals that America “wasn’t ready” simultaneously 
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to elect a black male president and another racial minority or a woman vice 
president. Biden had also been a primary rival, represented a small state compared 
to Obama’s Illinois, and was generally perceived as more of a centrist. But, by far, 
his most obvious strength as a ticket-balancer lay in his political knowledge of 
foreign policy and national security.  
Biden’s 35-year tenure on Capitol Hill, foreign affairs expertise, and 
longtime service as chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee stood in stark contrast to Obama’s short stint in Washington and near 
total lack of foreign policy credentials. Obama’s inexperience in this realm was 
thought to be a particular liability because of the on-going wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the broader War on Terror, and McCain’s vast experience in this 
area. Biden’s selection was viewed almost completely through this lens by the 
media and various commentators.32 Like Obama’s summer visit to Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Biden’s selection helped the Democratic nominee 
surpass the foreign policy threshold that presidential candidates frequently have to 
meet in times of international turmoil. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is worth remembering that John McCain was actually ahead in the national 
polls prior to the bottom dropping out of the economy on September 15. 
Following the Republican National Convention on September 1-4, McCain took a 
ten-day lead in polling. On September 2, Obama held a 6.4% advantage. But on 
September 7, McCain gained the upper hand and held it—topping out at a 2.9% 
edge—until Obama regained the lead on September 17 and never looked back.33 
It is remarkable that McCain was so competitive in a political environment in 
which 75% of voters thought the country was going in the wrong direction.34 
Once the economy crashed so precipitously, McCain was clearly at a severe 
disadvantage.  
For a candidate whose strengths lay in foreign affairs, who—months 
before the economic meltdown materialized—publicly said that “I am not an 
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expert” on the economy, and whose party controlled the White House, the turn of 
events was, to say the least, unfortunate. In addition, McCain’s greatest argument, 
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that he had been honorably right about the surge while Obama (and nearly 
everyone else) had been wrong, fell victim to its own success. As soon as the 
public realized that Iraq had stabilized, foreign policy subsided as an electoral 
issue. The only lingering effect was President Bush’s historically low approval 
rating (owed considerably to his Iraq policy), which constituted an unwelcome 
association for McCain and a perpetual drag on his candidacy. 
The extent to which the economy had come to dominate the campaign in 
its final weeks was evident when much of the first presidential debate on 
September 26, which was slated to be focused on foreign affairs, was spent 
discussing the economic panic.35 Exit polls indicate that, not surprisingly, the 
economy was the most important issue to 63% of voters and that, among this 
cohort, 53% supported Obama while 44% backed McCain. In the midst of an 
economic freefall and short of a national security crisis, it could hardly have been 
otherwise. Nonetheless, the exit polls still indicate that Iraq ranked as the second 
most important issue (10%) to voters, while terrorism tied with health care for 
third (9%). Those citing Iraq as the most important issue favored Obama 59% to 
39%, while McCain carried voters most concerned about terrorism 86% to 13%.36 
Nonetheless, foreign affairs still played a significant role in the 2008 
election. It was arguably the most important factor in determining the major party 
nominees. Without their stances on the Iraq War, it is unlikely that either Obama 
or McCain would have carried their party banners in the fall. In addition, foreign 
policy considerations were central to Obama’s selection of Biden. Like his 
summer visit to the Middle East, the Biden choice lent Obama foreign policy 
credibility, helping him to pass that critical litmus test presidential candidates face 
in times of international unrest. 
Thus, like the elections of 2002, 2004, 2006—and numerous pre-
September 11th elections—2008’s contest was influenced by foreign affairs. 
However, unlike many of these previous cases, the most important issue in the 
2008 general election was clearly the economy, particularly once the ugly specter 
of the economic crisis fully emerged in mid-September. This election, then, 
largely conforms to some of the expectations established in the classic political 
science literature on elections. Yet to categorize the 2008 contest exclusively in 
this manner obscures not only the role foreign affairs played in the campaign, but 
also the way in which most Americans experienced it. Although the general 
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election’s final stages focused on the economy, foreign affairs set the agenda and 
played a pivotal role early in the campaign. 
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